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Patricia was found drunk in a gas-filled house with her four-
year-old daughter, Lisa. The mother pleaded guilty to child neglect
and was placed on probation. The county probation officer sought
a dependency determination on the basis that Patricia was an unfit
mother and endangered Lisa's safety.' On July 3, 1969, Lisa was
made a dependent child of the juvenile court.2 Lisa was eventu-
ally placed with foster parents who wished to adopt her. Patricia,
however, refused to give her consent 3 despite her alcoholism, heroin
addiction and obvious inability to properly care for the child. Her
husband, Donald, had previously signed documents relinquishing
Lisa for adoption but insisted on the inclusion of a caveat that such
action "in no way admits that [he is] the father of this child."4
Indeed, Donald was not Lisa's father. In September of 1965,
Patricia had left Donald and began living with a man named Victor.
Eleven months later Lisa was born. Victor was designated as the
father on the birth certificate. Five months after Lisa's birth,
Patricia returned to her husband, and over Victor's objection, took
Lisa with her.
l." In re Lisa R., 13 Cal. 3d 636, 640, 532 P.2d 123, 125, 119 Cal. Rptr.
475, 477 (1975).
2. Any person under the age of 18 years who comes within any of
the following descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court which may adjudge such person to be a dependent child of
the court.(a) Who is in need of proper and effective parental care or con-
trol and has no parent or guardian, or has no parent or guardian
willing to exercise or capable of exercising such care or control,
or has no parent or guardian actually exercising such care or con-
trol. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 600(a) (West 1972).
3. A child born before or during the marriage of its parents or
within 300 days after the termination of such marriage by judicial
decree cannot be adopted without the consent of its parents if liv-
ing. CAL. CIv. CODE § 224 (West Supp. 1975).
4. In re Lisa R., 41 Cal. App. 3d 89, 92, 115 Cal. Rptr. 859, 862 (1974).
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By the time of the annual dependency review5 in 1973, Patricia
and Donald were both dead from drug overdoses. Victor, as the
putative father, appeared at the hearing for the purpose of gaining
visitation rights and, eventually, custody of Lisa.6 The juvenile
court, in its rejection of Victor's offer of proof, asserted that he
lacked standing to claim paternity. At issue were two sections
of the California Evidence Code. Under section 6218 all children
born to a wife cohabitating with a potent husband are deemed legit-
imate. This section creates a conclusive presumption which pre-
cludes all evidence rebutting the husband's paternity. Victor, as
the putative father, was not hampered by this presumption, since
Patricia was not living with Donald at the time of Lisa's birth.
Section 661,9 however, is applicable in noncohabitation cases.
Legitimacy is presumed when a child is born to a married woman
or within 300 days after the dissolution of marriage. This presump-
tion appears to be rebuttable; however, the statute permits only
the husband, wife, a descendant of either, and the state 0 to rebut
the legitimacy of the child. Victor was not one of those enu-
5. Under CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CoDE § 729 (West 1972), an annual hear-
ing is required to review the child's status and to determine if the depend-
ency status of the minor should be continued. This was the fourth such
review for Lisa.
6. Although appellant's long-range plan was to gain custody of Lisa, the
only issue before the court was whether Victor could offer evidence to dem-
onstrate that he was in fact the biological father. Fitness was not in issue.
7. The juvenile court also rejected the offer of proof on the grounds that
it had no jurisdiction to decide the issue of paternity. The California
Supreme Court, however, disagreed and held that
a juvenile court is ... vested with the authority to make such de-
terminations which are incidentally necessary to the performance
of those functions demanded of it by the Legislature pursuant to
the Juvenile Court Law. In re Lisa R., 13 Cal. 3d 636, 643, 532 P.2d
123, 127, 119 Cal. Rptr. 475, 479 (1975).
8. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the issue of a wife
cohabitating with her husband, who is not impotent, is conclusively
presumed to be legitimate. CAL. Evm. CODE § 621 (West 1966).
9. A child of a woman who is or who has been married, born dur-
ing the marriage or within 300 days after the dissolution thereof,
is presumed to be a legitimate child of that marriage. This pre-
sumption may be disputed only by the people of the State of Cal-
ifornia in a criminal action brought under section 270 of the Penal
Code or by the husband or wife, or the descendant of one or both
of them. In a civil action, this presumption may be rebutted only
by clear and convincing proof. Id. § 661.
10. The state can only rebut this presumption in a criminal non-support
action under CAL. PENAL Conn § 270 (West Supp. 1975):
If a parent of a minor child willfully omits, without lawful excuse,
to furnish necessary clothing, food, shelter or medical attendance,
or other remedial care for his or her child, he or she is guilty of
a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not exceeding one thousand
dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceed-
ing one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
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merated; thus, the presumption was conclusive as to him and he was
barred from rebutting the presumption of Lisa's legitimacy.11
In the unanimous decision of In re Lisa R., 12 the California Su-
preme Court reversed, holding that "a presumption which precludes
to appellant in the instant circumstances a right to offer evidence
to prove that he is the father of the minor child is unreasonable,
arbitrary and capricious, and a denial of due process."13  In strik-
ing down the presumption, the California Supreme Court relied
upon 'the United States Supreme Court's conclusive presumption
doctrine.
To understand the significance of In re Lisa R., it must be viewed
against the background of this doctrine. This Comment will trace
the development of 'the conclusive presumption doctrine, determine
its relationship to traditional substantive and procedural due
process analysis, and point out the inherent limitations of the doc-
trine which are recognized in In re Lisa R.
THE CoNcLusIVE PRESUmION DocTmR=
Evolution of the Conclusive Presumption Doctrine
The conclusive presumption doctrine is a modern development.' 4
11. "Although it is called 'rebuttable,' as a practical matter the pre-
sumption of section 661 is conclusive upon parties other than those to whom
it extends the right of dispute." In re Lisa R., 41 Cal. App. 3d 89, 93, 115
Cal. Rptr. 859, 862 (1974).
12. 13 Cal. 3d 636, 532 P.2d 123, 119 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1975). For articles
on the putative father aspect of this case, see Schwartz, Rights of a Father
With Regard to His Illegitimate Child, 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1975); Note,
Rights of a Putative Father in Relation to His Illegitimate Child: A Ques-
tion of Equal Protection, 22 SYR~cs L. 11Ev. 770 (1971); Comment, The
Emerging Constitutional Protection of The Putative Father's Parental
Rights, 70 MrtcH. L. REv. 1581 (1972); Comment, Plight of the Putative
Father in ,California Child Custody Proceedings: A Problem of Equal Pro-
tection, 6 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1 (1973).
13. 13 Cal. 3d at 651, 532 P.2d at 133, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
14. In two cases in the early 1930's, the Court invalidated certain tax stat-
utes which created conclusive presumptions. In Hoeper v. Tax Comm'n,
284 U.S. 206 (1931), the statute imposed a tax on the appellant which was
based in part on the income of his wife. In Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312
(1932), the statute created a conclusive presumption that gifts made within
two years prior to death of the donor were made in contemplation of death
and thus were required to be included in the decedent's estate and subject to
taxation. The Court held that these conclusive presumptions operated arbi-
trarily and therefore took the property of the taxpayers without due process
of law.
Stanley v. Illinois'5 was the first in a series of cases utilizing this
mode of analysis. In Illinois, the statutory definition of "parent"
did not include an unwed father.16 Thus, under the state child
dependency statute, when an unwed mother died, the state would
assume custody of the children since no legal "parent" existed.
Stanley, an unwed father, was denied a hearing on parental fitness
after the mother of his children died. "Stanley's actual fitness as
a father was irrelevant."'1 7 In effect, he was conclusively pre-
sumed unfit even though Illinois permitted "married fathers-
whether divorced, widowed, or separated-and mothers-even if
unwed-the benefit of the presumption that they are fit to raise
their children."'Is The United States Supreme Court held that
Stanley was entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before
his children were taken from him.'9 The Court recognized that
a fundamental interest-the maintenance of family relationships-
was at stake and noted that "the Constitution recognizes higher
values than speed and efficiency. ' 20 The conclusive presumption
inherent in the statute violated Stanley's due process rights.
A year later, in Vlandis v. Kline,2' the Court struck down Con-
necticut's statutory definition of nonresidents for purposes of tui-
tion schedules within the state university system 2 2 The statute
embodied a
conclusive and unchangeable presumption of nonresident status
from the fact that, at the time of application for admission, the stu-
dent, if married, was then living outside of Connecticut, or, if
single, had lived outside the State at some point during the preced-
ing year.23
The interests of the students claiming residency included the right
to travel and ithe opportunity to obtain a higher education at an
affordable cost. The corresponding state interest consisted only of
administrative convenience. The Supreme Court agreed with ap-
pellees' claim that they had a constitutional right to rebut the pre-
sumption of nonresidence and cited Stanley as controlling. The
Court agreed with Connecticut that a state could charge nonresi-
dents more for tuition than bona fide residents; however, it also
held that Connecticut had not afforded the students a fair oppor-
15. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
16. Id. at 646.
17. Id. at 647.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 649.
20. Id. at 656.
21. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
22. The appellees, classified as nonresidents, were forced to pay over four
times the amount of tuition charged to resident students. Id. at 444.
23. Id. at 443.
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tunity to establish their status as residents. Alternative means
were found available to accomplish this factual determination.
Therefore "[t]he State's interest in administrative ease and cer-
tainty [could not] . . . save the conclusive presumption from in-
validity under the Due Process Clause ....
The Court articulated its test for determining the constitutional-
ity of conclusive presumptions for the first time in Vlandis. If -the
presumed fact "is not necessarily or universally true in fact, and
... the State has reasonable alternative means of making the cru-
cial determination . . .125 the presumption cannot stand. The
state must allow the individual the opportunity to prove that he
or she does not fit into the presumed classification.
The latest decision in this line of authority, Cleveland Board of
Education v. La Fleur,26 involved challenges to school board regu-
lations which prescribed mandatory leaves for pregnant school-
teachers. Inherent in the regulations was the conclusive presump-
tion that such teachers were unfit to teach27 because of their preg-
nancy, without any individualized determination of such unfitness.
The teachers challenged the constitutionality of the regulations
which operated to deprive them of their livelihood. The Court de-
clared the regulations unconstitutional by virtue of the fact that
they "seriously burden the exercise of a protected constitutional
liberty." s2 This liberty was identified as the basic right to bear
a child.29 The Court further stated that 'the regulations penalized
female teachers exercising this right by requiring an unpaid, forced
leave of absence. The Court held that the regulations did not pass
the Vlandis test of "necessarily or universally true in fact."30
24. Id. at 451.
25. Id. at 452.
26. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
27. Id. at 644.
28. Id. at 651.
29. There is a right "to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether
to bear or beget a child." Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
30. See Vlandi. v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973). The capacity of an
expectant mother to continue work depends on the individual woman in-
volved. The regulations did not take any personal differences into consid-
eration. They presumed such teachers were incompetent "and that pre-
sumption applie[d] even when the medical evidence as to an individual
woman's physical status might be wholly to the contrary." Cleveland Bd.
of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632, 644 (1974). In addition, the school boards
had other reasonable means available to accomplish its goals of teaching
Thus, under 'the conclusive presumption doctrine, the United
States Supreme Court has invalidated statutes and regulations
which, in effect, create conclusive presumptions if the presumed
fact is not necessarily or universally true.31 The complainant is
then granted a right to rebut the presumption. Although classified
by the Court as a due process doctrine, the conclusive presumption
doctrine does not fit neatly into either of the two traditional
branches of analysis, substantive or procedural due process analysis.
The Conclusive Presumption Doctrine as a Product of the Interplay
Between Substantive and Procedural Due Process
Substantive due process analysis was applied primarily during
the early part of the twentieth century when the United States
Supreme Court invalidated social and economic legislation.82 Al-
though the Court recognized that sovereign police power existed,
substantive due process placed stringent restrictions on its use. The
Court, in applying this mode of analysis,88 would first focus on the
supposed legislative purpose of the challenged statute to determine
if it promoted the public health, safety, welfare or morals. The
next step was to decide if the means were reasonable and appropri-
ate to the stated ends; and under the guise of passing on the means'
appropriateness, the Court often substituted its own public policy
conceptions for those of the legislature. Finally, the effects were
continuity. The Court noted that the interest in continuity of teaching
would be satisfied "if the teacher herself were allowed to choose the date
so long as the decision were required to be made and notice given of it
well in advance of the date selected." Id. at 642. Convenience alone was
insufficient to justify infringement of the basic rights involved.
31. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973).
32. A major case utilizing this method of analysis was Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The statute involved prohibited employment of
persons in bakeries for more than 60 hours a week, or for more than 10
hours a day. The Court held it unconstitutional on the ground that it inter-
fered with the right of contract between the employer and his employees.
The statute's relation to the health and welfare of the employees was con-
sidered too remote to justify the infringement of such liberties.
33. In every case that comes before this court, therefore, where leg-
islation of this character is concerned and where the protection of
the Federal Constitution is sought, the question necessarily arises:
Is this a fair, reasonable and appropriate exercise of the police
power of the State, or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbi-
trary interference with the right of the individual to his personal
liberty or to enter into those contracts in relation to labor which
may seem to him appropriate or necessary for the support of him-
self and his family? ... Viewed in the light of a purely labor law,
with no reference whatever to the question of health, we think that
a law like the one before us involves neither the safety, the morals
nor the welfare of the public, and that the interest of the public
is not in the slightest degree affected by such an act .... We think
the limit of the police power has been reached and passed in this
case. Id. at 56-58.
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scrutinized to determine if the consequences of 'the statute's appli-
cation were too drastic on individual liberty and property interests.
The Court was not inclined to defer to legislative judgment, and
many statutory enactments were invalidated as violative of sub-
stantive due process.3 4 The Court soon abandoned the doctrine 35
and thereafter largely refrained from overstepping the domain of
the police power and substituting its judgment for that of the legis-
lature.3 16
The focus of due process analysis then shifted to the procedural
area. The personal rights of "liberty, or property '3 7 may not be
deprived without procedural due process. In civil cases, the Court
has expanded the notion of protected constitutional liberties and
has held that notice and a hearing must be provided before these
rights can be terminated.38 These requirements vary with the cir-
cumstances of each case. In a series of criminal cases3 9 the Court
effected a revolution in the criminal law by vastly expanding the
rights of the accused and setting out technical procedural guidelines
which must be afforded the alleged offender.
34. This doctrine was utilized almost exclusively for the protection of in-
dividual economic rights and the freedom to contract. See New State Ice
Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (statute restricting entry into ice man-
ufacturing business); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (stat-
ute providing minimum wages for women); Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590
(1917) (statute prohibiting employment agencies from collecting fees from
workers); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) and Adair v. United States,
208 U.S. 161 (1908) (statutes prohibiting "yellow dog" contracts).
35. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), where the
Court overruled prior decisions invalidating minimum wage laws as viola-
tive of due process.
36. The modern view of the Supreme Court regarding substantive due
process is illustrated by Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421
(1952), where the Court stated that it would leave debatable issues regard-
ing social and economic legislation to the judgment of the legislature. See
also Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
38. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). See also Perry v. Sin-
dermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Gold-
berg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395
U.S. 337 (1969).
39. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (scope of search inci-
dent to a lawful arrest); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (regulations re-
garding stop and frisk searches); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 'U.S. 436 (1966)
(right to counsel during custodial interrogation); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1962) (right to counsel in felony prosecutions); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961) (application of the exclusionary rule extended to state
criminal proceedings).
The conclusive presumption doctrine is, in effect, a product of
the interplay between the substantive and procedural aspects of due
process.40  In -he substantive area, the doctrine rejects the con-
clusiveness of the presumption embodied in the statute if the pre-
sumed fact is not universally true.41 Unlike the substantive due
process method, however, 'the statute is not struck down completely
when conclusive presumption analysis reveals a constitutional de-
fect. If relief is mandated, the court then applies procedural due
process remedies and allows evidence to be presented to rebut the
presumption. The complainant is entitled to a hearing to determine
the validity of the claim The basis of the constitutional defect
is substantive; the relief is procedural.
THE BOUNDARIES OF THE CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION
DocTRmnq-THE EvmENTaumY SPLToVER
Nature of Conclusive Evidentiary Presumptions
A presumption is an inference which the law requires the trier
of fact to draw once certain basic facts are established. 42 If basic
facts A and B are believed, then conclusion C must be presumed
to be true. If the presumption is conclusive, no evidence, however
convincing, will be admitted to refute C. Any dispute must be di-
rected toward the basic or foundational facts themselves, A and B.
Such evidentiary presumptions usually reflect external public pol-
icy 43 and their use promotes speed and efficiency in judicial actions
40. Although some commentators insist that the conclusive presumption
doctrine. is really a disguised equal protection analysis, it is readily dis-
tinguishable. The conclusive presumption doctrine differs from equal pro-
tection in that it does not strike down the classification itself but merely
allows the objecting party to demonstrate on which side of the classification
he belongs. Equal protection analysis would be weak in this area because
"reasonableness" under the lax standard is easy to prove. On the other
hand, the Court wishes to keep the number of "suspect" classes to a mini-
mum to avoid the far-reaching effects of "strict scrutiny." See, e.g., Simp-
son, The Conclusive Presumption Cases: The Search for a New Equal Pro-
tection Continues, 24 CATH. U.L. Rsv. 217 (1975); Note, The New Equal
Protection-Substantive Due Process Resurrected Under a New Name?,
3 ForD. URAN L.J. 311 (1975).
41. Where a statute presumes that "all A are B" and it is true in fact that
"some A are not B," then proof of the exception must be allowed. Vlandis
v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973).
42. CAL. Evm. CoDE § 600 (West 1966).
43. In In re Lisa R., the Court of Appeals noted that the social policy
of preserving the legitimacy of children underlies sections 621 and 661 of
the California Evidence Code. However, they also rejected the social policy
as not applicable today.
Historically, that policy gave protection against the obloquy of bas-
tardy. Only vestigial barbarism stigmatizes illegitimacy; a civilized
society does not view it as a sin or even a mild handicap. Deflated
to size, the statutory policy should seek no more than any other
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by eliminating the necessity of proving the obvious. However, very
few propositions outside the realm of mathematics and the natural
sciences are obvious in the sense that they are universally true.
Human behavior and the result of this behavior rarely conforms
to absolute rules. Nevertheless, this is immaterial to the mandatory
application of the conclusive presumption. It is, in effect, a substan-
tive rule of law,44 and the presumed fact's existence or nonex-
istence is immaterial. If the proponent can prove A and B, the
legal consequence follows even if the opponent could prove that
C does not exist.
In the utilization of the conclusive presumption doctrine there
are two major decisions the courts must make; (1) does the doctrine
apply to conclusive evidentiary presumptions, and (2) does the doc-
trine apply to all conclusive presumptions irrespective of the signifi-
cance of the interests they impinge upon?
Application of the Conclusive Presumption Doctrine to Conclusive
Evidentiary Presumptions
The United States Supreme Court, in deciding Stanley, Vlandis,
and La Fleur, analyzed the challenged statute or regulation by re-
formulating it as a conclusive presumption. The Court -then deter-
mined whether -the presumption passed the test45 of "necessarily
or universally true in fact" as articulated in Vlandis.4 6 Although
only substantive statutes have been invalidated by the Supreme
Court up to this time, the opinions' language strongly suggests that
the Vlandis test applies to conclusive evidentiary presumptions as
well.
In Stanley, the Court framed the issue as whether "a presumption
that distinguishes and burdens all unwed fathers [is] constitution-
ally repugnant .... ,,47 It seems logical to assume that since the
presumption-to eliminate or limit the element of indeterminabil-
ity. 41 Cal. App. 3d at 96, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
44. See C. McCoamcK, HANDBOOK or THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 342, at 804
(2d ed. 1972).
45. Although the test for determining the validity of conclusive presump-
tions was not clearly stated in Stanley v. Illinois, it was implied in language
applying to the particular facts of the case.
It may be, as the State insists, that most unmarried fathers are un-
suitable and neglectful parents. It may also be that Stanley is such
a parent and that his children should be placed in other hands. But
all unmarried fathers are not in this category; some are wholly
suited to have custody of their children. 405 U.S. 645, 654 (1972).
46. 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973).
47. 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972).
Court added an extra step in the analysis to reword the statute as a
conclusive presumption, it would likewise invalidate a conclusive
evidentiary presumption that was not disguised as substantive law.
While recognizing that "[p]rocedure by presumption is always
cheaper and easier than individualized determination," 48 the Court
also asserted that "the Constitution recognizes higher values than
speed and efficiency." 49 To the extent that conclusive evidentiary
presumptions are designed to promote speed and eliminate conflict-
ing results,50 there seems no overriding reason why they should
escape judicial scrutiny.
In Viandis, the Court stated that
[t]he State's interest in administrative ease and certainty cannot,
in and of itself, save the conclusive presumption from invalidity
under the Due Process Clause where there are other reasonable and
practicable means of establishing the pertinent facts on which the
State's objective is premised.51
It would be difficult to effectively argue that a challenger should
not be provided a forum to present rebutting evidence since eviden-
tiary presumptions apply during judicial hearings. It is also highly
unlikely that any conclusive evidentiary presumption would be able
to pass the exacting test of "necessarily or universally true in
fact." 52
Emphasis on the Importance of the Interests Involved
The question then arises as to the fate of all conclusive presump-
tions; both conclusive presumptions inherent in statutes and evi-
dentiary conclusive presumptions. The language used by the Su-
preme Court definitely suggests disfavor with -the process of pre-
suming rather than proving. Followed to its logical extreme, the
doctrine could invalidate all conclusive presumptions and convert
them into rebuttable presumptions.
While the invalidation of all conclusive presumptions might at
first seem an unlikely development, critics of the conclusive pre-
sumption doctrine have predicted that this analysis will have even
more revolutionary consequences. Chief Justice Burger in his dis-
sent in Vlandis voiced the fear that since "literally thousands of
state statutes create classifications permanent in duration, which
are less than perfect, as all legislative classifications are, and might
48. Id. at 656-57.
49. Id. at 656.
50. "[Tjhe statutory policy should seek no more than any other presump-
tion-to eliminate or limit the element of indeterminability." In re Lisa
R., 41 Cal. App. 3d 89, 96, 115 Cal. Rptr. 859, 864 (1974).
51. 412 U.S. 441, 451 (1973).
52. Id. at 452.
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be improved upon by individualized determinations, 5 3 the major-
ity's methodology poses a serious threat to the legal system itself.
Although agreeing that the purposes of the majority were laudable,
Justice Burger warned that
the urge to cure every disadvantage human beings can experience
exerts an inexorable pressure to expand judicial doctrine. But that
urge should not move the Court to erect standards that are un-
realistic and indeed unexplained for evaluating the constitutionality
of state statutes. 54
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in La Fleur55 traced the develop-
ment of law from a primitive system of ad hoc determinations of
controversies to the modem development of general laws, labelling
it "a significant step forward in the achievement of a civilized polit-
ical society." 56 The Court's position, Rehnquist reasoned, repre-
sented an attack on such progress and an attempt -to return to indi-
vidualized, case-by-case decision making. It "is in the last analysis
nothing less than an attack upon the very notion of lawmaking it-
self."5
7
Seizing upon the strong language used by Justices Burger and
Rehnquist, many commentators5 8 have echoed -the dissenters'
premonitions of impending doom to our system of lawmaking.
They fear that the adoption of the conclusive presumption doctrine
will lead to a wholesale invalidation of existing statutes. "Allowing
53. Id. at 462.
54. Id. at 463.
55. 414 U.S. 632, 657 (1974). Chief Justice Burger joined with Justice
Rehnquist in dissent.
56. Id. at 658.
57. Id. at 660.
58. See Bezanson, Some Thoughts on the Emerging Irrebuttable Pre-
sumption Doctrine, 7 IND. L. Rzv. 644 (1974); Sewell, Conclusive Presump-
tions And/Or Substantive Due Process of Law, 27 OKLA. L. REv. 151 (1974);
Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87
HARv. L. REv. 1534 (1974); Comment, Constitutional Law: The Irrebuttable
Presumption-An Alternative to Equal Protection, 14 WASH. L.J. 141 (1974).
For other articles on the conclusive presumption doctrine, see Simpson, The
Conclusive Presumption Cases: The Search For a New Equal Protection
Continues, 24 CATH. U.L. REv. 217 (1975); Note, The New Equal Protections-
Substantive Due Process Resurrected Under a New Name?, 3 FoRD. URBAN
L.J. 311 (1975); Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process:
Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HAv. L. REv. 1510
(1975); Note, The Conclusive Presumption Doctrine: Equal Process or Due
Protection?, 72 M1cx. L. REv. 800 (1974); Comment, The Right to Rebut:
Conclusive Presumptions in Civil Cases, 6 CONN. L. REv. 725 (1974); Com-
ment, Irrebuttable Presumptions As An Alternative to Strict Scrutiny:
From Rodriguez to La Fleur, 62 GEo. L.J. 1173 (1974).
an individualized determination for every individual affected by
legislatively created conclusive presumptions, seems an administra-
tive impossibility."5 9
It is true that nearly every statute can be reformulated as a con-
clusive presumption and that nearly every such presumption is at
least partly inaccurate. However, this does not mean that the con-
clusive presumption doctrine will be applied to every statute. Al-
though the Court has not yet given any clear guidance as to the
doctrine's scope, it is anomalous to assume that the Court intends
to create a state of anarchy by invalidating all legislative enact-
ments and conclusive evidentiary presumptions. It is highly un-
likely that the predicted revolution will come to pass. The legal
system can survive the advent of the conclusive presumption doc-
trine if the Court constructs adequate boundaries and limitations
on the doctrine's scope.
In Re Lisa R.-AN ATTEMPT TO DEF=NE
TE BouNIA ES OF THE DocTmRs
In In re Lisa R.,60 the California Supreme Court recognized the
conclusive presumption doctrine's applicability to evidentiary pre-
sumptions but suggested a manageable limitation on the scope of
the doctrine. The California court noted that the United States
Supreme Court in Stanley
premised its holding on "rights to conceive and to raise one's chil-
dren" and held that such rights could not be taken from a father
of a child born to a woman to whom he was not wed by operation
of a statutory presumption of the father's unfitness. 61
The court also noted that the right to raise -one's children is an
essential 62 and basic63 civil right which is far more precious than
property rights.64 Thus Victor's interest in Lisa "is not only cog-
nizable but also of sufficient substance to warrant deference"065
unless due process requirements are fulfilled. The court concluded
that a conclusive evidentiary presumption which denied a putative
father the right to prove parentage did not meet due process re-
quirements in that it was unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious. 6
The California Supreme Court's reference to Stanley and the
59. Note, Constitutional Law: The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine-
An Alternative to Equal Protection, 14 WASHBURN L.J. 141, 144 (1975).
60. 13 Cal. 3d 636, 532 P.2d 123, 119 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1975).
61. Id. at 648, 532 P.2d at 130-31, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 482-83.
62. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
63. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
64. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953).
65. In re Lisa R., 13 Cal. 3d 636, 648, 532 P.2d 123, 131, 119 Cal. Rptr. 475,
483 (1975).
66. Id. at 651, 532 P.2d at 133, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
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acknowledgment of the fundamental interests6 7 involved in both
cases, suggest the recognition of a limitation on the scope of the
conclusive presumption doctrine. The court in In re Lisa R. indi-
cated that for the doctrine to apply, there must be individual funda-
mental interests at stake. Admittedly the California Supreme
Court cannot authoritatively limit the United States Supreme
Court's doctrine. This limitation, however, is consistent with both
the language and the results in Stanley,68 Vlandis,6 9 and La
Fleur.7o
The result of the imposition of this limitation on the conclusive
presumption doctrine will be a dual standard for testing the consti-
tutionality of conclusive presumptions, similar to the dual standard
applied in the equal protection area.7 1 The strict standard, "nec-
essarily or universally true in fact,"7 2 will be applied only when
67. The term "fundamental interest" is not synonymous with the term
"fundamental right" used in the equal protection area. The "fundamental
interests" of the conclusive presumption doctrine encompass a broader
range of personal interests.
68. "The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired
and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful counter-
vailing interest, protection." 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). "[A]t the least,
Stanley's interest in retaining custody of his children is cognizable and sub-
stantial." Id. at 652. When
the procedure forecloses the determinative issues of competence
and care, when it explicitly disdains present realities in deference
to past formalities, it needlessly risks running roughshod over the
important interests of both parent and child. It therefore cannot
stand. Id. at 657.
69. The same considerations [as in Stanley v. Illinois] obtain here.
• . . [U]nder the State's statutory scheme, neither [of the appel-
lees] was permitted any opportunity to demonstrate the bona fides
of her Connecticut residency for tuition purposes, and neither wilt
ever have such an opportunity in the future so long as she remains
a student. 412 U.S. 441, 448 (1973).
70. "By acting to penalize the pregnant teacher for deciding to bear
a child, overly restrictive maternity leave regulations can constitute a
heavy burden on the exercise of these protected freedoms." 414 U.S. 632,
640 (1974). "[We hold that the mandatory termination provisions ...
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because of
their use of unwarranted conclusive presumptions that seriously burden the
exercise of protected constitutional liberty." Id. at 651.
71. When a classification affects only nonspecific constitutional rights, the
basis of the classification and its relationship to a permissible governmental
purpose need only be reasonable. However, if the classification is grounded
on "suspect" criteria or impinges on fundamental rights, it must be justified
by a compelling state interest. See Note, A Question of Balance: Statutory
Classifications Under the Equal Protection Clause, 26 STAN. L. RLv. 155
(1973).
72. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973).
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fundamental rights or "basic constitutional libert[ies]"7 3 are in-
fringed by -the application of the conclusive presumption. On the
other hand, the "necessarily or universally true in fact"7 4 standard
will not be utilized when reviewing the constitutionality of most
statutes and conclusive evidentiary presumptions which affect non-
fundamental interests. rn those instances, the state's interests in
speed and efficiency will outweigh the individual's interest to have
an opportunity to rebut the presumption.
CONCLUSION
Thus, the "necessarily or universally true in fact" 75 test will not
be applied to all statutes and conclusive evidertiary presumptions.
The court will selectively review the challenges to conclusive pre-
sumptions and limit the application of the doctrine to those in-
stances where fundamental interests are abridged. By limiting the
conclusive presumption doctrine in this manner, the fears expressed
by the dissenters and commentators will not become reality. The
feared attack on lawmaking will not materialize.
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73. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632, 647 (1974).
74. Vlandis.v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973).
75. Id.
As this article was going to press, the United States Supreme Court
decided two additional cases utilizing the conclusive presumption doctrine.
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975), exemplifies the limitation on the
doctrine's scope. A provision of the Social Security Act excludes surviving
wives and stepchildren who have familial relationships with a deceased
wage-earner for less than nine months prior to his death. The Court
upheld these duration-of-relationship requirements because they "lessen
the likelihood of abuse through sham relationships entered in contemplation
of imminent death." Id. at 780. Although the statute sets up a conclusive
presumption that the six-month marriage in question was a sham, the
Court distinguished Stanley, Vlandis, and La Fleur on the basis that a
"noncontractual claim to receive funds from the public treasury enjoys no
constitutionally protected status." Id. at 772. It is further noted that
"[ujnlike . . . the custody proceedings at issue in Stanley v. Illinois, such
programs do not involve affirmative Government action which seriously
curtails important liberties cognizable under the Constitution." Id. at 785.
In a more recent case, Turner v. Department of Employment Security,
96 S. Ct. 249 (1975), the Court followed its decision in La Fleur and in-
validated a Utah law which makes pregnant women ineligible for unem-
ployment benefits for a period extending from 12 weeks before childbirth
until six weeks after childbirth. The Court noted that this conclusive pre-
sumption of incapacity and unavailability for employment infringed the
petitioner's basic right to choose to bear a child. Since a substantial
number of pregnant women are not in fact incapacitated for this 18-week
period, the Court held the conclusive presumption invalid under the
principles enunciated in La Fleur.
Thus, the United States Supreme Court seems to be recognizing the
workable limitation on the scope of the conclusive presumption doctrine.
